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Datos a nivel de industrias muestran diferencias sectoriales marcadas en la relación entre 
exportaciones y ventas de multinacionales. Nosotros identificamos lo que es necesario para 
generar endógenamente estos patrones de exportaciones y ventas de multinacionales. 
Calibrando un modelo de competencia monopolística, encontramos que diferencias en 
costos de transporte de los bienes no son suficientes para capturar las diferencias sectoriales 
observadas, como se asume generalmente. Exploramos variantes al modelo básico y 
mostramos que impuestos sectoriales específicos a las ventas de multinacionales y home 







Industry level data shows striking differences among sectors in ratios of exports to FDI 
sales. We determine what is needed to endogenously generate this pattern of export and 
FDI sales. By calibrating a model of monopolistic competitive firms, we find that 
tradability of goods is not enough to capture the observed sectoral differences, as is 
commonly assumed. We explore variants of the model and show that sector-specific taxes 
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 1 Introduction
Industry level data shows striking di®erences in the choice to serve foreign markets through
exporting versus through selling goods produced by a foreign a±liate (what we call FDI
sales). Only recently has the \new trade theory" literature addressed this issue. Building
on Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004) show that models of monopolistic competition can
capture ¯rms' choice of foreign market servicing. These authors use reduced-form regression
analysis to show that di®erences in the form of foreign market servicing across sectors can
be explained by product tradability (how easy it is to actually trade/ship a product), ¯xed
setup costs and ¯rm productivity dispersion.
In this paper we identify varying aspects of the trade and FDI sale choice (e.g., tradability
and home bias) that explain the endogenous (and large) sectoral di®erences in the choices of
exports and FDI sales that Helpman et al. (2004) and others have empirically documented.
We derive a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition where ¯rms choose to
service a market through either exports or a foreign a±liate. The model is a multi-country
and multi-sector model where, using sectoral data on bilateral trade, FDI sales, employment
and costs, we test whether the tradability of goods can capture the observed variations
described above. We ¯nd that a measure of tradability alone is not enough to determine the
ratio of exports to FDI sales.
Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the tradability index we construct (where a
higher index value implies the good is less tradable, as explained in Section 5) and the ratio
of exports to FDI sales. The graph on the right omits the outlier sector of Petroleum and
Coal Products. It is evident that no strong relationship between the form of service ratio
and the tradability index exists. Moreover, Figure 1.2 shows there is no direct relationship
between the index and total sector sales.
We argue that by allowing for other dimensions of the model to be sector-speci¯c, we
can improve its explanatory power. To do so, we discuss ¯ve di®erent variants on a model
of monopolistic competition, where we allow for elements such as sector-speci¯c ¯xed costs,
sector-speci¯c ¯rm productivity dispersion, sales taxes, and home product bias in the utility
function. We ¯nd that sector-speci¯c ¯xed costs and productivity dispersion are not su±cient
to explain the observed di®erences in exports and FDI sales. However, sector-speci¯c sales
taxes on the operations of foreign a±liates and sector-speci¯c home product bias allow us
to do so. The latter provides more realistic results because the sales tax model requires
1Figure 1.1: Exports / FDI sales vs. tradability index.
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2implausible rates in some sectors of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background and
motivation and discusses the related literature. In section 3, we develop the model and
characterize the equilibrium of the economy. Comparative statics, discussed in section 4,
explore the elements of the model that can explain foreign market servicing di®erences.
Section 5 describes the data used in the numerical experiments presented in section 6. Finally,
we draw concluding remarks in section 7.
2 FDI and the \new trade theory"
This paper is part of a literature which studies foreign production and foreign market ser-
vicing going back to Mundell (1957) and Dunning (1973). In these classical papers, trade
and factor mobility (e.g., investment abroad) are studied as alternative forms of foreign mar-
ket servicing. Having a common starting point, the literature on foreign direct investment
diverted into two clearly di®erentiated streams.
The ¯rst branch sought to understand the impact foreign direct investment (FDI) on
the host economy rather than on the alternatives of foreign market servicing. Saggi (2002)
surveys the impact of FDI-friendly policies and their impact in terms of technology transfer
from developed (source) to developing (host) economies, and concludes that at the aggregate
level there is a positive impact of FDI on growth of the host economy. Alternatively, Alfaro
and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) ¯nd no conclusive evidence of the externalities or spillovers
of multinationals on local economies; except when the degree of development of the host
¯nancial markets is taken into account (see Alfaro et al. (2004) and Alfaro et al. (2009), for
example).
Our paper follows the second branch of the literature which is concerned with the choice
foreign market servicing. This literature, thoroughly discussed in Markusen (2004) and
Brakman and Garretsen (2008), studies foreign direct investment from an industrial orga-
nization point of view. Often referred to as \new trade theory," it explores the role of ¯rm
characteristics in foreign market servicing choices. While Dunning (1973) was the ¯rst to
address the importance of ownership, location, and internalization of production processes,
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) are the ones who formalize the behavior of ¯rm's production de-
cisions. Helpman (1984) took the next step by modeling ¯rms whose headquarters are in a
3di®erent location from that of where production takes place, proposing the ¯rst framework
for multinational corporations.
More recently, Melitz (2003) extended the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) to explain the impact of trade on intra-sector reallocations and changes in
aggregate productivity. However, his model became more successful in the trade literature,
examples of which are Helpman et al. (2004), Chaney (2005; 2006), and Arkolakis (2008).
The ¯rst of these papers extends Melitz's model to allow active ¯rms to choose between
servicing the \local" market only and servicing local and foreign markets, the latter through
exports or foreign a±liates, which brings us to our model.
In this paper we discuss the importance of heterogenous ¯rms that compete in a mo-
nopolistic competition fashion in explaining the choices between serving foreign markets
through exports versus FDI sales. One important assumption we make is that these two
options are mutually exclusive. Blonigen (2001) documents this regularity using Japanese
data. Moreover, we set up a model where horizontal FDI is the only option available to ¯rms
(i.e., the whole production process is carried out through a foreign subsidiary). Although
more general frameworks like Markusen (2004) allow for both horizontal and vertical FDI to
coexist, we justify our decision on two criteria. The question in our paper is how do ¯rms
service foreign markets (and hence how is di®ering composition across sectors determined)
and not how is the production process determined. Hence, in our model ¯rms cannot choose
to outsource parts of the production process, but rather choose among di®erent alternatives
of (foreign) market servicing. Additionally, Carr et al. (2001) suggests that horizontal FDI
is empirically more relevant that the vertical counterpart.
Our paper builds on Helpman et al. (2004), which uses di®erences in ¯xed setup costs, as
well as marginal and transportation costs to induce di®erent choices among ¯rms.1 Important
features of this model that we discuss later are:
(1) among ¯rms which choose to service the foreign market, the most e±cient ones engage
in FDI and the least e±cient, in exports;
(2) ¯rm level heterogeneity in productivity adds an important dimension to the tradeo®
between exports and FDI: ceteris paribus, sectors with higher dispersion in productivity
have lower relative export sales (and higher FDI sales);
1 Nocke and Yeaple (2007) extend the discussion to consider the choice between mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) and green¯eld FDI, which is outside the scope of this paper.
4(3) when the tradability index (transportation costs in their model) varies between sectors,
they ¯nd that sectors with high transport costs have lower relative export sales.
3 Benchmark model
This is an n-country model of di®erentiated ¯rms making foreign market servicing decisions.
A representative consumer in each country chooses consumption over the goods available
in her country. Goods are produce by ¯rms which choose whether to produce domestically
and abroad. The latter decision involves choosing between exporting or engaging in FDI
operations (i.e., production thorough a foreign subsidiary). In what follows, we discuss the
economy in detail.
3.1 Consumer's problem
The representative consumer in country i is endowed with Li units of labor that are inelas-
















t(!) is consumption of each di®erentiated good ! and ®i(!) is the good-speci¯c
































5We make the standard assumption that ½ 2 (0;1). This restriction in parameters guarantees
that we can aggregate consumption and endowments and solve the problem of a representa-
tive consumer in each country.




































are aggregate consumption and prices in country i, respectively. For notational simplicity,
we omit t as the equations are the same each period.
3.2 Firm's problem
In each country there is a continuum of ¯rms producing di®erentiated goods. Each ¯rm
draws two distinguishing qualities:
(1) productivity level ', where higher ' implies higher productivity. ' 2 (1;1) is dis-
tributed Pareto;
(2) tradability index ¿, representing the ease of international trade, where higher ¿ implies
the good is less tradable; ¿ 2 (1;1); the probability of observing ¿ is q(¿).
A ¯rm producing good ! is identi¯ed by the pair (';¿).
Firms that enter the domestic market (d) must pay a ¯xed entry cost fe prior to observing
their realizations of ' and ¿. If they remain in the market, they pay a ¯xed operational cost
fd. These ¯rms may service foreign markets by choosing between exporting (x) and FDI (m).
If they do so, ¯rms have to pay a ¯xed entry cost which di®ers for each option of foreign
market servicing (fex, to engage in exports; fem, to engage in multinational operations).
6Given there is no uncertainty in our model, once a ¯rm enters the market, it will never
choose to exit. There is, however, an exogenous ¯rm death rate (^ ± 2 (0;1)) that bounds the
value of entering the market.
As in Melitz (2003), the foreign market servicing decision is taken after a ¯rm knows its
type (';¿). Hence, ¯rms are indi®erent between paying a one-time entry cost (fex or fem) or
making per-period payments (±fex or ±fem), where ± ´ (1 ¡ ^ ±)¯ and ¯ is the time discount
factor.2 For convenience we assume the latter and de¯ne:
fx ´ ±fex
fm ´ ±fem
as the per-period ¯xed costs for exports (x) and multinational operations (m), respectively.
Labor is the only factor of production. The technology is determined by labor input









where in the case of exports, the tradability index is interpreted as an iceberg cost that
requires more labor be devoted to production. Marginal production costs and entry costs
are paid in labor units.
For simplicity we assume international markets are segmented to preclude arbitrage of
goods from occurring. Hence, we exclude the option to reexport and multinational sub-
sidiaries cannot export their production. Hence, ¯rm (';¿) maximizes pro¯ts in each market
independently:




((1 ¡ ^ ±)¯)tf =
1 X
t=0


































Firms have market power arising from the fact that they produce di®erentiates goods.
Hence, given Bertrand competition and using the demand functions arising from the con-
sumer's problem, the ¯rst order conditions yield pricing rules for goods sold in the domestic



























if ym(';¿) > 0:
For a draw of ' and ¿, a ¯rm will:
















83.3 Feasibility and market clearing
Given prices fP ig, wages fwig, and our assumption on market segmentation, in each country







k be the set of (';¿)-¯rms in country i that are actively producing for market k 2
fd;x;mg. We assume that all countries have the same distributions for ¿ and '. Thus, the
























































dG(')dF(¿) + Mefe; (3.6)
where Me is the mass of entrant ¯rms.
3.4 Productivity and cuto® functions




m(¿)g. The cuto® functions '¤
k(¿) come from the zero pro¯t
conditions for each servicing scheme, given by equations (3.4). Hereafter, for notational
simplicity, we write all functions of ¿ as: z¿(¢) ´ z(¿;¢).3 Notice we also assume that
countries are symmetric, which implies prices and other aggregate variables are common
across countries.
These cuto® functions segment ¯rms into the di®erent options of production. The seg-
mentation within each tradability type ¿, which we formally derive below, is as follows: the
3 This is especially useful when we switch to discrete values for ¿ later on. Then ®¿(!) = ®(';¿) is not a
function of ¿, but identi¯ed according to each good ! and corresponding ¿.
9Figure 3.1: Cuto® values






















lowest productivity group for each ¿, upon paying the entry cost and realizing they are un-
pro¯table, chooses not to produce. The ¯rms with middle productivity will only serve the
domestic market. The ¯rms with highest productivity choose to serve the foreign market.
Among this group of ¯rms, the most productive do so through FDI sales. This is a standard
assumption in the literature (see Helpman et al. (2004)). The cuto® conditions are depicted
in Figure 3.1.
Cuto® equations
Let revenues be ri
k;¿(') ´ pi
k;¿(')yi
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Recall we assume that for each ¿, among the ¯rms servicing foreign markets, the least
e±cient choose to export and the most e±cient engage en FDI sales.4 For this assumption to
follow, we must impose conditions on ¯xed costs, which can be trivially derived from (3.9):
4 This relationship is reported in other countries as well: Buch et al. (2005) and Wagner (2006) ¯nd this is



























We can see in Figure 3.1 that for higher ¿ (implying the good is less tradable), fewer
¯rms will ¯nd it pro¯table to export and the cuto® '¤
x;¿1 < '¤
x;¿2 for ¿2 > ¿1.
Entry condition and average productivity
Firms entering the market pay a ¯xed labor cost fe. Hence entry is conditional on the
discounted present value of pro¯ts being greater than or equal to the entry cost. A general

















































where ¹e;¿ ´ 1 ¡ G('¤








and ¼¿ is the ex-ante expected pro¯t for a given ¿.
Let ~ 'k;¿('¤
k;¿) be the average productivity of ¯rms with index of tradability ¿, conditional


















k;¿ is the productivity of the marginal entrant with ¿. For notational simplicity, we
will refer to ~ 'k;¿('¤
k;¿) as ~ 'k;¿.
Productivity ' is drawn randomly from a Pareto distribution with:





, and PDF: g(') = aba
'a+1,
where b is the lower support of the distribution and a determines the shape of the distribution.
Given this distribution, for a ¯rm engaged in k 2 fd;x;mg with tradability index ¿, (3.10)
becomes:











We calculate average pro¯ts ¼k;¿ given index ¿ and mode of servicing k by integrating
(3.70) over '. It is trivial to show that average pro¯t for ¯rms with index ¿ engaged in market
servicing k 2 fd;x;mg calculated this way is equal to the pro¯ts of the average producer
with that tradability index servicing market k:
¹ ¼k;¿ = ¼k;¿(~ 'k;¿); k 2 fd;x;mg;
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Equations (3.9) and (3.12) complete the characterization of our equilibrium.
4 Qualitative predictions
In this section, we show that we cannot use this \type" of model to reach an unequivocal
conclusion about the relationship between the ratio of exports to FDI sales and tradability.
Nevertheless, we show that under certain conditions, tradability and home bias can reproduce
sectoral patterns observed in the data. We do so by discussing how productivity cuto®s are
a®ected by changes in ¿ and ®. To do so, we identify each sector by the average tradability
¿ of its ¯rms (which will later be computed from the data). We look at the comparative
statics for changes in a good's tradability index within sector ¿ and between two sectors ¿
and ^ ¿, as well as changes in the utility function weights ®.
13For computational purposes, we assume there is a discrete number S of ¿'s (i.e., a discrete
number of sectors identi¯ed by their tradability index). To simplify notation, let ®('k;¿;¿) =










equilibrium we can write any function of ¿ as:
zk(¿) = zk;¿(ª):
From the zero pro¯t condition and (3.9), we have a relationship between average pro¯t and
the cuto® productivities such that
¼k('
¤
k;¿(ª)) = 0 , ¼k(~ 'k;¿(ª)) = fkh('
¤
k;¿(ª)); 8k 2 fd;x;mg;











Additionally, for each ¿ de¯ne
j('
¤





















k;¿(ª))] < 0: (4.3)











and from (3.9) we obtain the cuto® productivity levels for ¯rms producing domestically,













































The expressions in (4.5) allow us to analyze the general equilibrium impact of changes in
the tradability index (¿) and good weights in the utility function (®), as shown in the next
subsections.
4.1 Changes in tradability ¿




































where nk is the measure of ¯rms engaged in productive activity k. We employ this expression
as well as the following lemma in the propositions below.
Lemma 1 When the marginal entrant's good in sector ¿ becomes harder to trade (i.e., the




@¿ < 0;8^ ¿.







































































































Proposition 2 If the cuto® productivity for domestic market production is highly responsive
to changes in the tradability index in sector ¿, the marginal FDI-engaged ¯rm's productivity
in sector ¿ increase with ¿, and viceversa. In other words,
@'¤
m;¿(ª)
@¿ < 0 if and only if the


































































The converse follows trivially from above.
From the above propositions, we see that while an increase in tradability decreases ex-
ports, exports over FDI sales will only increase when the ¿-elasticity of '¤
d is low enough.
4.2 Changes in utility weights
An alternative explanation to the varying ratios of exports/FDI sales are sectoral di®erences





































Additionally, from (4.5) we have partial derivatives for cuto® productivity levels with








































We employ 4.11 along with Lemma 2 to derive two important results.
Lemma 2 When the utility weight ®x;¿ in sector ¿ increases, the productivity of the marginal




































´ > 0: (4.12)
This means that if consumers' value for consuming a good increases, all other things
equal, they demand less of that good and more of others. In the steady state, the aggregate
price decreases, there are less ¯rms in the market, and the marginal and average domestic
¯rms must be more productive.
Proposition 3 The productivity of the marginal exporter in sector ¿ increases with that









































18As before, when ®x;¿ increases, the marginal and average exporters in sector ¿ must be more
productive.
Proposition 4 If the cuto® productivity for domestic market production of a good is very
responsive to changes in the valuation (weight) of that good, the marginal FDI-engaged ¯rm's
productivity in sector ¿ decrease with ®. In other words,
@'¤
m;¿(ª)
@®x;¿ < 0 if and only if the ®-



































































The converse follows trivially from above.
In this case, we show that while an increase in home bias decreases exports, exports/FDI
sales only increases when the ¿-elasticity of '¤
d is high enough.
5 Data
In this paper we test a simpli¯ed two-country version of the model presented in sections
3 and 4. To do so, we require multi-sector data in four categories: (1) bilateral trade;
(2) bilateral FDI sales; (3) total employment and non-production labor, and (4) indices of
transportation costs. All data is in SIC (rev 1987) format for the United States and Canada
in 1997. There are two reasons we choose this year. The ¯rst one is the discontinuity in
19industrial classi¯cation systems: the FDI sales data was recorded in SIC prior to 1999, and
in NAICS format thereafter. The other reason is that 1997 provided data for the largest
number of sectors. Since the model can be treated as static, there is no need for multiple
years. We organize the industry-level data into the 20 sectors presented in Table 5.1. We
describe the data below.5
5.1 Bilateral international trade
We use import and export data from Feenstra et al. (2002) for the U.S. and Canada for
1997. The import data used is the custom value of imports (millions of U.S. dollars) and is
used to weight tari® and freight data (see below). The export data we use, also in millions
of U.S. dollars, is the value of exports from the U.S. to Canada.
5.2 Bilateral FDI sales
The FDI sales data used comes from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006). We use
data on sales by all foreign a±liates by sector as well as country. In particular, we look at
U.S. a±liates operating in Canada. According to the BEA, a foreign a±liate is any foreign
business in which there is a direct investor from the U.S. owning or controlling at least
10% of voting securities or the equivalent. This de¯nition indistinctly includes mergers and
acquisitions as well as green¯eld investment.
5.3 Employment
We use total employment by sector as well as non-production workers by sector from the
1997 Economic Census of Manufacturing published by the U.S. Census Bureau (2001). The
latter is constructed from the reported data such that: non-production labor equals total
employment minus production workers.
Of the 20 sectors for which we have data on exports and FDI sales, we only have employ-
ment for 15. The excluded sectors are: Instruments and Related Products; Construction,
Mining, and Materials Handling Machinery; Other Electrical Equipment, Appliances, and
5 More details are available from the authors.
20Components; Other Petroleum and Coal Products; and Other Chemicals and Allied Products
(see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Industry level data
Industry SIC (Rev.1987) ¿ Exports FDI Total U.S. Non-prod.
codes Sales Employ. Workers
Grain Mill and Bakery
Products
2041+2051+2053 1.0638 45 3,106 357,543 128,286
Other Food and Kindred
Products
20-(2041+2051+2053+2082) 1.0741 4,467 10,075 1,109,413 226,363
Tobacco Products 21 1.1208 24 698 33,594 9,153
Textile Products and
Apparel
22+23 1.1420 2,881 1,414 1,338,136 224,379
Lumber, Wood, Furniture,
and Fixtures
24+25 1.0550 3,252 4,600 570,034 93,809
Paper and Allied Products 26 1.0519 3,054 7,560 574,274 134,178
Chemical Products, nec 2819+2869+2879+2899 1.0676 3,874 2,497 882,645 370,493
Soap, Cleaners, and Toilet
Goods
2841+2842 1.0532 1,240 2,438 126,446 48,692





1.0829 3,514 11,399 nr nr
Petroleum and Coal
Products, nec
2999 1.0660 122 10 107,625 36,071
Other Petroleum and Coal
Products
29-2911-2999 1.0552 49 12,844 nr nr
Rubber Products 301+302+305+306 1.0676 2,104 2,306 202,353 41,081
Glass Products 321+322+323 1.0742 1,013 341 128,565 23,514
Other Stone, Clay, and
Other Nonmetallic Mineral
Products
32-(321+322+323) 1.1280 744 2,035 372,906 89,059
Primary and Fabricated
Metals




353 1.0385 3,046 1,283 nr nr
Household Audio and Video,
and Communications
Equipment
365+366 1.0360 3,417 1,309 294,865 159,552
Electronic Components and
Accessories
367 1.0176 4,523 1,530 593,802 161,529
Other Electrical Equipment,
Appliances, and Components
36-363-365-366-367-369 1.0448 4,881 3,921 nr nr
Instruments and Related
Products
38 1.0351 4,973 1,410 nr nr
Exports and FDI sales in Millions of U.S. Dollars.
Employment in thousands.
nr = Data not reported.
Sources = See section 5.
215.4 Tradability index
In our model, we use data on freight costs and tari®s to construct a tradability index. This
data is collected by Schott (nd) in SIC rev. 1987 format according to year and sector. The





The freight rates are also import-weighted for each year as:
freight = 1 ¡
cost insurance freight (cif) imports
free on board (fob) imports
: (5.2)
Thus, the tradability index ¿ is de¯ned by:
¿ ´ (1 + freight)(1 + tari®); (5.3)
where a higher index implies the good is less tradable. We calculate these indices by sectors
according to the concordance described in Table 5.1 (through import-weighting).
6 Numerical experiments
In this section we present ¯ve variations of our model in an attempt to match the observed
ratio of exports to FDI sales for Canada and the U.S. in 1997 for 20 sectors. Recall that we
identify sectors by their average tradability ¿ as constructed from the data. Moreover, we
assume the marginal exporter in each sector has that ¿. Alternative approaches to sector
classi¯cation can be considered however, they are outside of the scope of this paper.
We interpret the utility function weights (®) as home-product bias, i.e., taste di®erences
for goods produced at home (by domestic and foreign multinational ¯rms) versus abroad
(imported). We normalize ®i(^ 'i
d;¿;¿) = ®i(^ 'j
m;¿;¿) = 1; where ^ 'i
d;¿ is the productivity of
¯rms producing domestically in i and ^ 'j
m;¿ that of foreign subsidiaries producing in i. Finally,
we assume the two countries are symmetric for computational simplicity.
22The mass of operating ¯rms in autarky
In the case of autarky, it is trivial to calculate the (endogenously determined) mass M
of operating ¯rms. The tradability index ¿ is not relevant here, so we can simplify notation.









































































Hence, M is the autarky mass of operating ¯rms in any given country.
The mass of operating ¯rms in the open economy
We de¯ne the mass of domestically operating ¯rms as in (6.2). This comes from the fact
that the most ine±cient active ¯rm in all sectors ¿ is the same (and given by (3.9)). Thus,
the mass of ¯rms in each sector ¿ is:
M¿ = q¿M: (6.2a)













¹k;¿ is the probability of engaging in foreign market servicing k 2 fx;mg in sector ¿, condi-
tional on being an active ¯rm. The ¯rst expression is the measure of ¯rms servicing foreign
markets via exports and the second, that of FDI conditional on operating in sector ¿. Adding
the three expressions above, we get:





where n is the number of countries in the world. Equation (6.2b) is the total measure of ¯rms
operating in sector ¿ and (6.2c) is the total measure of ¯rms operating. The symmetry as-
sumption across countries implies this is the total number of ¯rms a country's representative
consumer owns.
Given the de¯nitions above, we write an expression similar to (3.6) which indicates em-
ployment in each sector ¿:
L
i
¿ = feMe;¿ + [fd + n(¹x;¿fx + ¹m;¿fm)]M¿
so that Li =
P
¿ Li
¿ is aggregate labor. Since aggregate payments to production workers must
be equal to the di®erence between aggregate revenue and pro¯ts, and normalizing wages to
1, production labor Lp = R ¡ ¦. Additionally, market clearing conditions imply that labor
devoted to pay entry costs is Le = Mefe. In a steady state equilibrium, ¯rm entry and exit
are equal, i.e., (1 ¡ G(!¤))Me = ±M. Hence the free entry condition implies:
Le = Mefe =
±M
(1 ¡ G(!¤))
fe = M¹ ¼ = ¦
Together, these conditions imply aggregate revenues R = Lp + ¦ = Lp + Le = L. This
condition completes our system of equations.
24Ratio of exports to FDI sales
To calculate the ratio of exports to FDI sales, we construct total sector sales in the model.
We ¯x the probability q¿ of being in sector ¿ as the fraction of that sector's total exports
and FDI sales over total sales for the 20 sectors, as found in the data:
q¿ =
FDI sales¿ + exports¿ P
s (FDI saless + exportss)
:
Additionally, we choose the ¯xed costs of production for each sector, to match the measure
of ¯rms that operate in each sector and mode of servicing. To see this, consider the measure

































which relies only on parameters.


















































256.1 Benchmark model: common ¯xed costs, ®¿ = 1
In the benchmark model, the ¯xed costs are assumed to be county-speci¯c (as opposed to
sector-speci¯c). All utility weights are set equal to one. We use the parameters shown in
Table 6.1 and ¿ from Table 5.1, as well as q¿ described in section 5. Figure 6.1, shows this
version of the model grossly missed the observed ratio of exports to FDI sales.
Table 6.1: Parameters for baseline model
Parameter Value Description
½ 0.5 utility function parameter
®¿ 1 utility weights
wh 1 home country's wage
wf 1 foreign country's wage
L 65,000 labor endowment
fe 65 ¯xed entry cost
fd 1.3 ¯xed domestic cost
fx 1.5 ¯xed export cost
fm 2.2 ¯xed FDI cost
^ ± 0.03 death rate of ¯rms
S 20 # sectors in the economy
a 2 shape parameter Pareto distrib.
b 1 lower support Pareto distrib.
All labor units are in thousands.
Targets are described in the discussion.
6.2 Sector-speci¯c ¯xed costs, ®¿ = 1
In this speci¯cation, each sector has di®erent ¯xed costs. We modify our assumptions on























to be consistent with empirical observations reported in Helpman et al. (2004).




26Figure 6.1: Estimated vs. actual exports/FDI sales: benchmark model.





























Figure 6.2: Estimated vs. actual exports/FDI sales with sector-speci¯c ¯xed costs.































































































which satis¯es the ¯rst restriction. Finally, we choose fm;¿ to match exports to FDI sales
data, provided this does not violate the rule above. All other parameters are as in Table 6.1.




































As shown in Figure 6.2, the model fails to match the observed data for some sectors.
From equation (6.3), it is trivial to see that in this variant of the model, calibrating ¯xed
costs does not su±ce to match the data. This is because fm has to be so small that there is
no incentive to export, i.e., we would violate '¤
x;¿ < '¤
m;¿ (see the right panel in Figure 6.3).
286.3 Sector-speci¯c productivity dispersion, ®¿ = 1
In this variant of the model, we test the claim from Helpman et al. (2004) that there is a
high cross-sectoral relationship between productivity dispersion and ¯rms' choices of foreign
market servicing. We allow for the productivity distributions to be sector-speci¯c and we
set ®¿ = 1. Speci¯cally, we allow for a, the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution
(see Section 3) to vary among sectors. Moreover, sectoral di®erences are the same across
countries, in line with our assumption of symmetry.
Equation (3.11) requires the following restriction on parameters:
½
1 ¡ ½
¡ a¿ < 0; 8¿: (6.6)
























is needed for consistency with empirical observations of ¯rm productivity cuto®s.






where we applied symmetry across countries. From the data we have ¿ > 1 so we can see
that:
(1) for ½ < 1, we are only able to match those sectors with lower exports than FDI sales:
exports¿
FDI sales¿ < ¿
½
½¡1 < 1;
(2) for ½ > 1, we are only able to match those sectors with higher exports than FDI sales:
exports¿
FDI sales¿ > ¿
½
½¡1 > 1.
Hence, it is evident that under the assumptions made, this variant will fail to replicate the
intra-sectoral variability in the exports-to-FDI sales ratio as observer in the data.








, under certain parameters could we replicated the














With ½ < 1 as we assume, ¿
½
½¡1 < 1, such that the ratio of exports to FDI sales could be
smaller or larger than 1. However, parameter restrictions would not allow to accommodate
for the large intra-sectoral variation.
6.4 Sector-speci¯c tax on multinational sales, ®¿ = 1
This variant of the model is one of the two cases where we are able to match the data, as
depicted in Figure 6.4. We allow for sector-speci¯c sales taxes on multinational operations,
along with sector-speci¯c ¯xed costs (to satisfy '¤
x;¿ < '¤












where ¾¿ ¡ 1 is the sales tax, when ¾¿ < 1, or subsidy, when ¾¿ > 1. We leave other goods
untaxed for computational simplicity and because what matters are sales taxes in a sector




















30Figure 6.4: Estimated vs. actual exports/FDI sales with sector-speci¯c ¯xed taxes/¯xed
costs.












































In Table 6.2 we show the calibrated sales taxes for each sector. Notice that in order to
preserve the relationship '¤
x;¿ < '¤
m;¿, and have non-zero exports, for a large enough ¾¿,
fm;¿ must increase. This relationship is depicted in Figure 6.5. A downside to this variant
is that implausible tax rates are required for Petroleum and Coal Products and Electronic
Components and Accessories, as well as large subsidies for other sectors. The reason for this
is that with constant markups, the only way to generate high enough di®erences between
FDI sales and exports is by a®ecting supply side components of prices.
Notice that given our calibration algorithm, the model predicts total sector exports and
FDI sales which are very close to the observed values (see Figure 6.6). Additionally, the left
panel of Figure 6.7 shows total sector employment arising from the model against observed
employment. As in Helpman et al. (2004), we compare non-production workers to ¯xed FDI
costs. This relationship is positive and shown on the right panel of Figure 6.7.






































Table 6.2: Industry-speci¯c sales tax
Industry ¾¿ ¡ 1
Grain Mill and Bakery Products -0.234
Other Food and Kindred Products -0.264
Tobacco Products -0.207
Textile Products and Apparel -0.186
Lumber, Wood, Furniture, and Fixtures -0.043
Paper and Allied Products -0.110
Chemical Products, nec 0.539
Soap, Cleaners, and Toilet Goods 0.368
Other Chemicals and Allied Products 0.162
Petroleum and Coal Products, nec 14.852
Other Petroleum and Coal Products 7.046
Rubber Products -0.456
Glass Products -0.090
Other Stone, Clay, and Other Nonmetallic Mineral Products 0.041
Primary and Fabricated Metals 0.452
Construction, Mining, and Materials Handling Machinery -0.224
Household Audio and Video, and Communications Equipment 0.735
Electronic Components and Accessories 4.151
Other Electrical Equipment, Appliances, and Components 0.562
Instruments and Related Products -0.134






































Figure 6.7: Total sector employment and non-prod. workers vs. ¯xed FDI Cost































































Not reported: Soap, Othr Chem.,
Othr Petrol., Constr. & Mining,
Othr Elect. Equip, & Instr.
Corr.=0.490
33Figure 6.8: Exports and FDI sales









































← Data Model →
6.5 Sector-speci¯c utility weights (home bias)
For this speci¯cation, we assume that ®d;¿ = ®m;¿ = 1; 8¿ and allow for sector-speci¯c ®x;¿.
We interpret this formulation as consumers having di®erent preferences on locally- versus
foreign-produced goods (commonly known as home product bias in the trade literature).
























to guarantee consistency with empirical cuto®s. We calculate total sector sales using (3.8)
and the corresponding mass of ¯rms. The model can match the ratio of exports to FDI
sales, although it fails to match the absolute sectoral sales, as shown in Figure 6.8. This
occurs because weights ®x;¿ are chosen to match the ratios, directly a®ecting the cuto®
productivities for exporting ¯rms, which did not previously occur.
In spite of this, total sectoral employment in the model is highly correlated with the
data (corr.=0.784), which is also the case for non-production workers and ¯xed FDI costs
34Figure 6.9: Total sector employment and non-prod. workers vs. ¯xed FDI Cost





























































Not reported: Soap, Othr Chem.,
Othr Petrol., Constr. & Mining,
Othr Elect. Equip, & Instr.
Corr.=0.876
(corr.=0.876, see Figure 6.9). The latter result provided the possibility of calibrating these
¯xed costs with non-production labor data. Since this data is only available for 15 of the
sectors, we recalibrated this version of the model to these 15 sectors. Although we match the
ratio of exports to FDI sales, we no longer have a strong relationship between non-production
labor and ¯xed FDI cost (¯gure 6.10), hence, we did not pursue this calibration exercise.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we determine what is needed to endogenously generate the large variations of
exports to FDI sales among sectors. To do so, we build on the Helpman et al. (2004) model
of monopolistic competition where ¯rms can choose between the foreign market servicing
options of exports and FDI sales. To calibrate this model, we aggregate ¯rms into sectors
and we show that tradability and productivity dispersion are not enough to match sectoral
data on exports and FDI sales for the U.S. and Canada in 1997.
We o®er two alternative variations of our benchmark model that allow us to match these
sectoral di®erences. The ¯rst variation is a model with sector-speci¯c taxes on multinational
operations and the second one has sectoral home product bias. It is important to note that
35Figure 6.10: Non-production workers vs. ¯xed FDI Cost (15 sectors)





































the required tax rates on multinational ¯rms are in some cases implausible, hence the home
product bias model is more appealing.
Future research is required to ¯nd less restrictive approaches in sector classi¯cation. In
particular, our assumption that all the ¯rms in a sector have the same tradability index for
their good is in°exible. Additionally, empirical validation of the utility function weights is
needed. In spite of the limitations that this class of models present, we believe they have
the potential to provide important policy insights regarding foreign market servicing.
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